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In the wake of Citizens United, political action committees (PACs) face new sources of 
competition from super PACs and 501(c)4 social welfare organizations and 501(c)6 professional 
associations for both donor contributions and electoral influence. Using itemized and summary 
committee files from the U.S. Federal Election Commission, I investigate factors that predict 
PACs’ fundraising success between 2008 and 2014 and I examine the impact of PAC 
contributions on House candidates’ vote margins since 1992. While I uncover evidence of PAC 
fundraising challenges that may relate to growing competition from other groups, I also find 
PAC contributions to House candidates have increased in importance. Taken together, the results 
suggest PACs continue to occupy a vital niche in campaign financing.  
 
 




Political action committees (PACs) constitute the second largest source of campaign 
money in congressional races (Herrnson 2012). Yet as a consequence of the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Citizens United sanctioning the ability of independent expenditure only groups—
primarily super PACs and 501(c)4 social welfare organizations, 501(c)5 unions, and 501(c)6 
professional associations—to raise and spend money in unlimited amounts to influence federal 
elections (Smith and Powell 2013; La Raja 2014; 558 U.S. 310, 2010), PACs face new sources 
of competition for both donors’ dollars and electoral influence. Additionally, Citizens United 
created an asymmetric regulatory regime in which PACs, unlike the aforementioned groups, 
remain subject to constraints on their fundraising as well as a set of reporting requirements that 
501(c)4, 5 and 6 organizations can largely avoid and super PACs can skirt in some instances. 
While PACs remain the only interest group organizations that are able to contribute funds 
directly to federal candidates and while they now have a legal option to maintain their own soft 
money independent expenditure accounts, legal restrictions on their fundraising may hamper 
their ability to influence federal elections to the same extent as the less fettered super PAC and 
501(c)4, 5 and 6 organizations. And although many interest groups now maintain a PAC along 
with a super PAC or even a related 501(c)4 social welfare organization, the question remains as 
to whether PACs’ fundraising and related influence in elections have been affected because of 
these developments.  
As the creations of the amended Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA), for 
many years PACs remained the only vehicles for interest groups to raise and spend money to 
influence federal elections (Magleby and Goodliffe 2014). Since the implementation of FECA, 
PACs must report all of their activities to the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC). From a 
democratic perspective, they are ideal because they operate in relative transparency. And 
	 3 
although they contribute money to federal candidates to gain influence over both election 
outcomes and elected officials’ behavior in office, their ability to disproportionately influence 
elected officials is curbed by legal contribution limits on fundraising and giving. While these 
features now place them at a fundraising disadvantage relative to other groups, they are 
advantageous with respect to the maintenance of democratic elections and representation. If 
super PACs and 501(c)4 and 501(c)6 organizations eventually supplant PACs, there will be even 
less transparency in campaign finance. Moreover, candidate campaigns will lose an important 
source of hard dollar funding that they now need more than ever to maintain their own spending 
in elections in which super PACs, 501(c)4 social welfare organizations, and 501(c)6 professional 
associations now dominate and in which candidates’ parties face similar handicaps to federal 
PACs under the remaining components of campaign finance laws (La Raja and Schaffner 2015).  
 This study investigates the fundraising capacity of PACs relative to other interest group 
vehicles and the impact of PACs’ financial support of House candidates overtime. First, I 
examine the determinates of PAC fundraising because so little is known about what leads donors 
to contribute to one PAC versus another. I test whether federal PAC contributions from 
individual donors are dependent upon the PACs’ connections to affiliated groups, the PAC’s 
prominence in the media, the PAC’s connections to a party network, the PAC’s ability to raise 
soft money in congressional races, among other characteristics predictive of a PAC’s fundraising 
success. I also examine changes in these characteristics overtime and look for indications of 
rising competitive pressures on PACs’ fundraising. Second, using a matching analysis, I 
investigate whether PAC contributions to House candidates have the same, lesser, or greater 
impact on House candidates’ vote margins before and after the changes in campaign finance law 
introduced by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (pre-BCRA and post-BCRA eras) 
	 4 
and subsequent Supreme Court rulings. The most important advantage PACs retain is their 
singular ability among interest group vehicles to contribute directly to candidates. Given that 
parties face fundraising constraints, there is reason to expect congressional candidates have 
become more dependent upon direct hard dollar contributions from PACs (La Raja and 
Schaffner 2015). Thus, an examination of whether the impact of PAC support has changed is 
critical for determining changes in their influence relative to other groups and their influence 
relative to political parties—which serve as the other primary vehicle for channeling hard dollars 
to candidates. Third, I examine a variety of descriptive statistics as well as the average cost per 
dollar raised overtime for evidence of rising fundraising competition between PACs and super 
PACs.  
The results suggest PACs face new sources of financial competition but have done well 
by raising record amounts of hard dollars. I also uncover evidence that PAC contributions are 
more important than ever to the campaigns of non-incumbent and incumbent House candidates 
in the post-BCRA era. The analyses suggest PACs continue to occupy an important niche in 
campaign financing.  
 
Regulations, PAC Fundraising, and Electoral Impact  
Although PACs’ greatest advantage stills lies in their ability to provide funds directly to 
federal candidates, those funds must be collected from individuals and other political groups in 
legally limited amounts. Using those hard dollar receipts, PACs may only contribute a maximum 
of $5,000 to each federal candidate per calendar year (Herrnson 2012). While many PACs 
bundle individual donor contributions to receive credit for raising the funds they distribute to 
campaigns and other political groups thereby circumventing their own direct contribution limit, 
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they must still collect those funds in legally limited increments (Marshall 1997)—those limits 
range from $2,300 per election in 2008 to $2,600 per election in 2014 as the rates are subject to 
adjustments for inflation. In contrast, super PACs, and 501(c)4 social welfare organizations, 
501(c)5 unions, and 501(c)6 professional associations can raise unlimited amounts of money so 
long as their expenditures are made independently from candidate campaigns (Taylor and 
Holman 2010; Smith and Powell 2013). With respect to fundraising, these groups can approach a 
single donor for a donation of any size. In 2014, they raised an average reported contribution of 
$15,323.  
PACs must also report all of their financial activity, including individual receipts over 
$200, and all of their expenditures, including general operating expenditures, to the U.S. Federal 
Election Commission (FEC). Super PACs must register with the FEC and are subject to the same 
disclosure requirements as other committees (Smith and Powell 2013). 501(c)4,5 and 6 groups 
are required to report electioneering communications, which are advertisements that could be 
reasonably interpreted to be express advocacy for or against a federal candidate (even if specific 
advocacy language is avoided) within 30 days of a primary or within 60 days of a general 
election, to the FEC (Taylor and Holman 2010; Barker 2012). Both super PACs and the 
aforementioned 501(c)4,51 and 6 groups are also required to report other independent 
expenditures that are made expressly in support of or against federal candidates to the FEC 
(Barker 2012).  
																																																								
1	Unions (501(c)5s) can also raise and spend independently in unlimited amounts but must publicly report itemized 
disbursements to the Department of Labor.  
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However, both super PACs and the aforementioned 501(c) groups have found ways to 
circumvent these reporting requirements by running issue ads that avoid specific candidate 
advocacy language, running ads outside the reporting windows, by asking donors not to earmark 
donations in support of a particular federal candidate for electioneering communications, among 
other evasive tactics (Barker 2012; Maguire 2016). Moreover, 501(c) groups can keep their 
contributors anonymous as they are not required to report itemized fundraising receipts to the 
FEC (Taylor and Holman 2010; Smith and Powell 2013; La Raja 2014). Super PACs have also 
found ways to protect donors’ identities by relying upon intermediary organizations to channel 
funds from donors to their coffers (Garett 2016). Finally, some groups that file with the Internal 
Revenue Service simply choose not to report any expenditures to the FEC even though their 
taxation registration as a 501(c)4 organization signifies they should (Barker 2012).  
  PACs must now compete for donors with groups that enjoy considerable fundraising 
advantages and, in some instances, a lighter regulatory burden. Although some PACs are 
indirectly linked to such groups through affiliated parent organizations, they still must raise 
funds independently and they must do so by raising contributions in legally limited amounts and 
report those contributions to the FEC. In 2011, non-connected PACs successfully sought and 
gained the ability to raise and spend unlimited amounts of soft money as long as it was kept in a 
separate account from hard dollar federal receipts (see Carey v. FEC, Civ. No. 11-259-RMC (D. 
D.C. 2011)). Nevertheless, non-connected PACs must also pay for their operating expenses out 
of the donations they collect and continue to report all receipts and expenditures to the FEC. 
Despite the gains for some PACs under Carey, PACs’ fundraising handicaps could still hamper 
their relevance in the post-Citizens United regulatory environment. However, there are major 
	 7 
gaps in our understanding of PAC financing that must be addressed before an assessment can be 
made of how well they financially faring in comparison to these groups. 
A review of previous studies suggests there are lacunas in the literature with respect to 
what predicts PAC fundraising success overtime and whether the impact of PAC contributions in 
federal elections has changed overtime. The determinants of PACs’ fundraising success have 
received scant attention in the political science literature making it difficult to rely upon previous 
work for predictions as to whether their financial clout may have changed as a consequence of 
alterations in campaign finance law. Wilcox (1989) examines PACs organizational 
characteristics, including the type of PAC, its membership size, age, and the presence of an 
office in Washington D.C. but did so in relation to their contribution behavior rather than 
fundraising success. Masters and Baysinger (1985) provide the most comprehensive study to 
date. Using a two-stage regression model, on the one hand, they investigate whether PACs 
connected to corporations with larger numbers of employees, assets, profits, and a history of 
PAC activity in previous election cycles (modeled as dummies for those cycles) are able to raise 
more money overall. In the second stage, they also analyze whether industry concentration, the 
percentage of unions in the firms’ industries, the percentage of product purchases by the federal 
government, and the degree of industry regulation impact PAC fundraising outcomes. They find 
the firm’s assets, profits, size, and PAC history all positively increased the PAC’s receipts as do 
unionization, the degree of regulation, and the federal government’s purchases of industry goods 
and services.   
As suggested by Masters and Baysinger (1985), the PAC’s fundraising capacity rests 
largely upon its donor base—in their study, connected PACs linked to corporations with more 
employees raised more money. Consequently, PACs with ideological membership bases, such as 
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the National Rifle Association and EMILY’s List, and built-in membership bases, such as unions 
and professional associations, should enjoy greater fundraising advantages (Rozell, Wilcox and 
Madland 2006). On the other hand, Eismeier and Pollock (1985) point out that PACs “need and 
get less commitment and participation from ‘members’” than other types of organizations (193). 
Although few political science studies examine PAC donor characteristics (see Francia, 
Herrnson, Powell and Wilcox 2003; Sorauf 1984 for exceptions), “what evidence there is 
suggests low engagement” (Eismeir and Pollock 1985, 195). Of course, engagement may vary 
with the organization’s prominence and apparent effectiveness. In interviews with PAC 
managers, Eismeir and Pollock (1985) found PAC donors care about the PAC’s record of 
making a decisive difference in close congressional races and in backing winning candidates. 
Thus, the PAC’s candidate support and its reputation may also factor into its fundraising success. 
Finally, there is evidence a PAC’s connection to other interest groups and to the major parties 
can impact this success. Baker (2014) demonstrates there is a multiplier effect associated with 
PAC contributions to congressional candidates in which parties and allied PACs work together to 
channel contributions to important races—although the degree to which parties shepherded PAC 
funds to candidate campaigns declined in the post-BCRA era as parties shifted their spending 
strategies to target fewer races, devoted more resources to independent spending, and increased 
spending late in the election cycle (Baker 2014).   
 Fewer studies investigate whether PAC contributions have any direct impact on election 
outcomes even at the margin. Alexander (2005) finds a positive correlation between the total 
PAC contributions raised by the campaign and the candidate’s share of the major party vote 
percentage. Biersack and Viray (2005) qualitatively evaluate the electoral impact of four major 
interest groups, the National Rifle Association, NAACP, AFL-CIO, and Americans for Job 
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Security in the 2000, 2002, and 2004 elections. They connect PAC contributions and 
expenditures with positive electoral outcomes (Biersack and Viray 2005). While a single PAC 
contribution is unlikely to have much of an effect because it is limited to $5,000 per election (the 
primary and general count as separate elections), the sum of PAC contributions that make up the 
candidate’s campaign treasury not only suggests the candidate boasts a solid fundraising base, 
particularly if that candidate is a non-incumbent, but also suggests that candidate is connected to 
a broader network of donors (Herrnson 2012). Additionally, hard dollar contributions are still a 
sought-after resource in federal elections. 
 
PACs’ Unique Niche in Campaign Financing  
 The primary advantage that PACs retain in the post-BCRA era is the same advantage 
they had in the pre-BCRA era, namely their ability to contribute money directly to federal 
campaigns. Federal candidates continue to rely upon this money to get elected and they can only 
accept hard dollar contributions under campaign finance law. For this reason, I hypothesize the 
degree to which the PAC is involved in federal races and the number of races the PAC typically 
supports might be factors that draw donors to contribute (see also Eismeir and Pollock 1985 
above). Although in contrast to the limited hard dollar support PACs can provide, super PACs 
and 501(c)organizations (IE groups) can spend unlimited amounts of money independently in 
support of or in opposition to candidate campaigns, the utility of these funds for candidate 
campaigns is suspect (Baker 2015a; La Raja and Schaffner 2015; Malbin and Glavin 2018). La 
Raja and Schaffner (2015) point out that “decisions about the use of the marginal dollar cannot 
be made when campaign organizations are legally cordoned off from one another and each IE 
group has already allocated its money to be spent on a particular activity” (130). They go on to 
	 10 
argue “the emphasis on IEs entails an emphasis on TV” rather than “grassroots efforts” (130), 
which are central to campaign success. As a consequence, I do not expect PACs’ status as a 
Carey PAC will increase their success in raising hard dollar from donors. Donors hoping to 
provide support that goes directly to candidates will contribute to PACs or candidates. Donors 
wishing to engage in independent spending will give elsewhere.  
 Additionally, there are other resources that traditional federal PACs can provide to 
candidates that most super PACs and 501(c) social welfare organizations typically do not. As La 
Raja and Schaffner (2015) point out, in addition to campaign money, large and active 
membership bases, “especially those that are distributed broadly throughout the nation, [are] 
valuable because it provides [politicians with] direct access to voters” and “endorsements from 
groups that are viewed positively by many voters” (18; Rozell, Wilcox and Madland 2006). 
Interest groups with membership bases are also more likely to make endorsements, which have 
been shown to increase non-incumbent candidates’ fundraising gains from donors (Baker 
2015b). For all of these reasons, I predict PACs with a membership base will enjoy greater hard 
dollar fundraising success.  
 In contrast to many of the newly minted super PACs and 501(c) social welfare 
organizations, many federal PACs have existed for long periods of time and, therefore, have 
established reputations and names that are recognizable information shortcuts for voters and 
donors alike (Baker 2015b). Thus, I expect PAC fundraising success will be positively related to 
the reputation of the PAC as measured by mentions in prominent media sources (see variable 
specification below).  
 Finally, whether the PAC contributes to one set of party committees and does not 
contribute to the other party, might also be an indication of the PAC’s integration into party 
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networks and access to party donor bases—factors which should positively impact PAC 
fundraising success. Parties have a long history of alliances with particular PACs, which are 
considered to be part of the extended party network (Herrnson 2009; Koger, Masket and Noel 
2009)—there is good reason to believe such alliances may entail channeling funds to allied PACs 
as well as channeling PAC funds to candidates. The PAC’s status as a Leadership PAC is 
similarly expected to increase its fundraising appeal with donors seeking influence because those 
incumbents with Leadership PACs often either have party leadership positions or have 
aspirations of obtaining party leadership positions.   
 Aside from PACs, political party organizations are the only other financing vehicle that 
can engage in hard dollar contributing. La Raja and Schaffner (2015) theorize legal constraints 
on parties’ financing post-BCRA have led candidates to rely upon other sources of funds 
particularly those supplied through “policy-demanding” interest groups (90). And they argue 
changes in the law that incentivized independent spending have also shifted power dynamics 
within party coalitions providing an upper hand to ideological purists who are more likely to 
engage in independent spending because they do not fear public backlash for their views (128). 
Hence IE groups allow purists to avoid the “moderating mediation of the party organizations” 
(128).  
 In addition to advantaging super PACs and other IE groups, weakening party influence 
could also elevate the importance of PAC support for candidates particularly as politics becomes 
more polarized and more moderate candidates fail to win seats in Congress (La Raja and 
Schaffner 2015). As La Raja and Schaffner (2015) argue, legal “constraints on parties enable 
partisan interest groups to assume a large and less constrained role in elections” (5). There is also 
evidence that the alliances between parties and allied PACs weakened between the pre-
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BCRA(1992-2002) and post-BCRA eras (2004-2012) (Baker 2014). Parties have increasingly 
utilized independent expenditures to redress their spending disadvantages in comparison to other 
IE groups and this undermines their ability to cooperate with allied PACs because under law they 
must avoid coordination (Baker 2014). Additionally, in an effort to efficiently target more of 
their resources to the congressional races in greatest need, parties supported dramatically fewer 
congressional candidates in the post-BCRA era than they did in the pre-BCRA era—between 
1992 and 2002 they made direct contributions to almost half of nonincumbent House candidates 
who ran but after 2002 they directly contributed funds to only 137 nonincumbent House 
candidates out of the 2,180 who ran (Baker 2014). It is possible such strategic choices by parties 
led a majority of federal candidates to rely more upon PAC support as a source of hard-dollar 
funds in the post-BCRA era. For all of these reasons, I expect the positive impact of PAC 
support on candidate vote margins to strengthen between the pre-BCRA and post-BCRA eras.  
 
Data and Methods 
 Both the capacity of PACs to raise hard dollar contributions from donors and their ability 
to influence House elections are examined in the models to follow. Data are obtained from the 
U.S. Federal Election Commission’s individual contribution, itemized committee, PAC 
summary, and candidate summary files. The fundraising models utilize contribution and PAC 
summary data from 2008 to 2014 and the electoral impact models rely upon campaign finance 
data from 1992 to 2014. Joint fundraisers are excluded from the PAC fundraising models. 
However, leadership PACs as well as connected and unconnected PACs are included.  
 The dependent variable in the OLS fundraising models is the total hard dollar 
contributions from donors to PACs in thousands of dollars. Calculations are made using the 
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individual contributions to committee files (2008-2014). These totals as well as all other monies 
in this model are adjusted to be in 2008 constant dollars to facilitate comparison across different 
years. Characteristics predictive of PAC’s successful fundraising from individual donors are 
included as independent variables in separate regression models for each of four election cycles: 
2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. The goal of this analysis is not only to examine the importance of 
each characteristic but also to determine whether the significance of each characteristic changed 
overtime.  
The degree to which an interest organization successfully influences elections 
corresponds strongly to its reputation and status as a public representative for particular 
constituencies (Grossman 2012). As a consequence, an organization’s prominence likely affects 
its ability to fundraise from donors. As a measure of organizational prominence, media mentions 
of each PAC are tabulated from three Washington news sources—The Hill, Washington Post, 
and Roll Call—between January 1, 2004 and November 31, 2014 (PAC Mentions). The 
construction of this variable follows the method used by Grossman (2012) to develop a media 
prominence measure of interest group influence. Lexus Nexus searches were conducted and 
duplicates eliminated using Excel for registered PACs in 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. 
In addition to prominence, organizations featuring established membership bases have a 
ready-made donor pool to facilitate fundraising goals (Rozell, Wilcox and Madland 2006). The 
PACs of unions and trade associations, and PACs with memberships, such as EMILY’s List, fall 
into this category and are coded 1, 0 otherwise (Membership Base). Similarly, interest groups 
with strong ties to party organizations may be better connected to party donor bases. As a 
consequence, PACs that contributed to any of the national party committees and that did not 
contribute to both parties are identified as party allies and are coded 1, 0 otherwise (Party Ally). 
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To capture the PACs involvement in congressional elections, I include the number of 
congressional candidates to which the PAC made a direct contribution in each of the four 
election cycles included in this analysis. I also include a dummy indicating if the PAC is a 
Leadership PAC. Finally, PACs with a separate segregated soft money account, also known as 
Carey PACs, are coded 1 and 0 otherwise (Carey).  Robust standard errors are utilized to address 
slight heterogeneity in the error variances.   
 A matching technique called coarsened exact matching (CEM) is utilized for the second 
set of models assessing the influence of PAC money on House candidates’ electoral margins (see 
Blackwell, Iacus, King and Porro 2009). Like other matching procedures, CEM matches House 
candidates who received above median PAC support with similar House candidates who did not 
receive the same degree of support thereby mimicking assignment of subjects to treatment and 
control groups in experimental studies. Separate matching analyses are conducted for non-
incumbents and incumbents and different controls are included in each respective set of models. 
Additionally, the data are separated into two time periods, the pre-BCRA (1992-2002) and post-
BCRA eras (2004-2014), with matches made separately in each time period. All financial 
variables are placed in 1992 dollars to facilitate comparisons across time periods and matches 
within each time period. Mimicking experimental designs, the primary independent variable is 
dichotomous (Treated) using different cut points by era and type of candidate. In the pre-BCRA 
era, the cut points for median PAC support are $321,878 for incumbents and $12,000 for non-
incumbents. In the post-BCRA era, the cut point for the treatment of median PAC support was 
$797,035 for incumbents and $13,688 for non-incumbents. House candidates are matched prior 
to analysis using a range of characteristics and contextual variables, each of which is coarsened 
into meaningful categories prior to matching—this is primarily done by examining the 
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distribution of each variable. These matched cases along with their uncoarsened original 
covariate values are retained and observations that do not have a match within the strata, which 
the algorithm creates, are dropped. CEM generates the test statistic L1 (ranging from 0 to 1, with 
0 indicating complete balance and 1 indicating complete imbalance). This statistic and the match 
rates are used to assess the balance between the treatment and control groups.  
 After the matching analysis, to calculate the sample average treatment effect on the 
treated (SATT) a simple OLS regression of the treatment dummy on the House candidates’ vote 
margins including the strata-based weights generated by the CEM logarithms is performed. The 
House candidate’s victory or loss margin is expressed as a percentage (Vote Margin). The 
treatment is whether the candidate received above median PAC support or not (see above) from 
all types of PACs as reported in the campaign summary files.  
 Non-incumbents House candidates and House incumbents are separately matched with 
other non-incumbents House candidates and House incumbents using variables which previous 
studies suggest are predictive of their electoral success. As a consequence, the covariates used 
for matching slightly differ in each set of models. Non-incumbents are matched based upon their 
political party (Republican) and whether or not they ran for an open-seat (Open). The quality of 
the candidate is controlled for using a dummy indicating whether the non-incumbent House 
candidate held previous elected office (Abramowitz 1991; Herrnson 2012). Since constituent 
ideological preferences in general are such strong predictors of who chooses to run and who gets 
elected (Jacobson and Kernell 1981), district ideological preferences are added using the 
percentage of the two-party presidential vote received by the Democratic candidate (Dem Pres 
Vote Share). A dummy variable is also included to represent the vulnerability of the House 
incumbent, or open-seat opponent, based upon Rothenberg’s ratings of House races 
	 16 
(Vulnerable). Additionally, a number of financial variables are added to the models. The non-
incumbent’s receipt of party contributions can influence their vote margin and likelihood of 
winning: party direct and coordinated contributions are added together and party independent 
expenditures on behalf of the candidate are separately employed for matching as each may have 
distinct effects (La Raja and Schaffner 2015; Baker 2015a). Total contributions from individual 
donors and independent expenditures by groups other than PACs are also coarsened separately 
for the matching analysis. Independent expenditures in support of the candidate are already 
associated with the candidate’s FEC identification number in the FEC’s summary files. 
However, independent expenditures against the candidate rather than against the candidate’s 
opponent are also coupled with each candidate’s identification number. Thus, in order to 
determine which independent expenditures were made against the candidate’s opponent thereby 
helping the candidate in question, it was necessary to reorganize the data. The covariates used for 
analysis are subsequently the independent expenditures by parties or interest groups conversely, 
that were made in support of the candidate combined with the independent expenditures made by 
parties or interest groups against the candidate’s opponent in the race. The party and interest 
group independent expenditures covariates are separate totals. Finally, the candidate’s total 
disbursements are also included as previous studies suggest candidate expenditures may affect 
whether the campaign is successful or not (Gerber, 1998; Green & Krasno 1988) 
 Incumbents are matched according to their seniority, political party (Republican), a 
dummy variable representing Rothenberg’s rating of their race as competitive or not, the 
Democratic presidential vote in their district, and whether they face a quality challenger or not. 
Their total individual contributions and party contributions (direct and coordinated) as well as 
party independent expenditures and total independent expenditures by other groups (as above) 
	 17 
are used as separate covariates in the matching process. Lastly, incumbents’ total disbursements 
are also utilized to make matches.  
To compare PAC and super PACs fundraising2, I examine their sources of revenue in 
constant 2008 dollars in Figure 1. All data are gleaned from the FEC’s summary and itemized 
committee contribution files. I also analyze the cost per dollar raised overtime for both PACs and 
super PACs in Figure 2. These calculations were made using the FEC’s operating expenditure 
files and total receipts from the committee summary files (2008-2014). As PACs and super 
PACs do not consistently apply the codes for fundraising that are requested but not required by 
the FEC, it was necessary to review the operating files on a line item basis using the descriptions 
for each line item as well as the vendors to determine which line items constituted fundraising 
costs. A discussion of the elimination process can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Results 
 The results of the PAC fundraising models are displayed in Table 1. A glance at the table 
shows the characteristics of the PAC that significantly predict total fundraising from donors 
change overtime. The number of times a given PAC is mentioned in the Washington media 
significantly increases PAC fundraising from individual donors in 2008 and 2010 but the 
																																																								
2 501(c)4 and 501(c)6 organizations only report summary revenue totals to the Internal Revenue Service. These 
groups engage in politics to a varying degree that is not simply represented by their tax classification. Cross 
referencing IRS reports with FEC reports would not provide an accurate assessment of which groups engaged in 
spending to influence elections as some 501(c)4 and 6 organizations choose not to report to the FEC even though 
they should (Barker 2012). As a consequence, gaining accurate revenue totals for politically active 501(c)4 and 6 
groups is not feasible and gaining totals by revenue source (which are not reported anywhere) would be impossible.  
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significance of the effect disappears after that. In 2008, each media mention is worth an 
estimated $1,966 to the PAC, all else equal, and in 2010 each mention is worth $2,615. But by 
2012, media coverage does not exert a significant effect on donor receipts. The number of 
federal candidates the PAC supported significantly increases individual contributions to the PAC 
in all of the election cycles. In 2008, each additional candidate results in a predicted $1,786 in 
donor receipts, all else equal. The amount climbs in each subsequence election cycle. For each 
candidate in 2010, the PAC is predicted to receive $1,937 more in donor receipts; in 2012, the 
PAC receives $2,176, and in 2014, the PAC receives $2,845, all else equal. A membership base 
also significantly increases donor contributions to the PAC by a predicted $34,970 in 2012 and 
$46,480 in 2014—with the significance of this variable increasing between these two election 
cycles. However, the presence of a membership base does not significantly impact fundraising 
from donors in 2008 or 2010. Both of these developments will be discussed below as they could 
be indicators that PACs are facing new competitive pressures from other groups.  
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
The PAC’s ties to the party only significantly increases fundraising in 2010. In that year, 
a PAC, which contributed to at least one of the parties’ national committees (and not to 
committees of both parties), is predicted on average to enjoy an additional $169,100 in revenue 
from donors. This result suggests the alliances between PACs and parties are likely better 
reflected in their mutual support of congressional candidates more so than monetary support of 
one another. Previous work suggests parties played an important role in terms of channeling 
PAC money to important congressional races in the pre-BCRA era but that role diminished in the 
post-BCRA era with changes in campaign finance laws that led to the rise of party independent 
spending and the dominance of purists within party coalitions (Baker 2014; La Raja and 
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Schaffner, 2015). Additionally, the number of PACs contributing to either one party’s set of 
committees or the other has changed overtime. In 2008, 410 PACs made direct contributions to 
one of their party’s committees. In 2010, 469 PACs did so. However, in 2012 and 2014, the 
number of contributing PACs declined respectively to 440 and 353.  Finally, as predicated, the 
ability of the PAC to retain a soft money account under the Carey v. FEC ruling does not 
significantly impact individual fundraising in 2012 or 2014. Similarly, being a Leadership PAC 
does not significantly increase donor contributions in any of the four election cycles.   
Matching Analysis: PAC Contributions and Candidates’ Electoral Competitiveness  
 The results of the matching analysis are presented in Tables 2 and 3. In the first matched 
set featuring non-incumbent House candidates competing in the pre-BCRA era, there is 
considerable improvement in the L1 statistic between the auto baseline and user-coarsened 
models. L1 decreases from 0.882 to 0.683. Although the match rate is not an improvement over 
the baseline model, the total number of matched cases for analysis is still over 1,000 and the L1 
statistic suggests a high degree of balance between the treatment and control groups has been 
achieved. In the post-BCRA set of non-incumbent House candidates, there is also a major 
decline in the L1 statistic from 0.826 to 0.650 suggesting greater balance has been achieved. 
Additionally, the match rate of the user-coarsened model actually improves upon the match rate 
for the baseline model: 56 cases are added to the treatment group. Greater variation in the 
covariates among non-incumbent House candidates facilitated the construction of these matched 
sets for both time periods. Unfortunately, incumbent candidates are much more similar to one 
another—for instance, only 12 percent of them are classified as vulnerable in the 1992-2002 
dataset and only 8 percent of them fall into this category in the 2004-2014 dataset. As a 
consequence, it can be slightly harder to cluster them into meaningful groups for comparison 
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resulting in the marginal improvements that are observable between the auto-baseline and user 
coarsened models in pre-BCRA era models in Table 3. There is a small improvement in the L1 
statistic but even this small decrease this was only achieved by sacrificing the number of 
matched cases. Five hundred thirty-four additional cases in the control group and one hundred 
seventy cases in the treatment group are unmatched between the auto-baseline and user-
coarsened models. The post-BCRA era proved to be better for identifying quality matches. The 
L1 statistic decreases from 0.982 to 0.796. Although the number of unmatched cases increased 
between the auto-baseline and user-coarsened models by 459 in the control group and 172 in the 
treatment group, the sample that is retained for analysis remains over 1,000.   
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here> 
 
 After the matching process, a simple OLS regression tests the effect of the treatment—
above median PAC support—on the House candidate’s vote margin. The results of both 
regressions are at the bottom of Tables 2 and 3. In the pre-BCRA era, non-incumbents contesting 
in House races are estimated to gain 3.59 percentage points on their vote margin with PAC 
support above the median amount of support given during that time period (see Table 2). 
However, House incumbents are not predicted to receive any significant gains (see Table 3). In 
the post-BCRA era, on average non-incumbent House candidates are predicted to receive a 6.81 
percent gain in their margins with the receipt of above median PAC support (see Table 2) 
whereas House incumbents are expected to see a 2.48 percent increase (see Table 3). For both 
sets of candidates, the positive impact of PAC support increases between the two time periods 
suggesting PAC contributions play a larger role in candidate success in the post-BCRA era.  
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The differences that are uncovered for incumbents and non-incumbents are in keeping 
with previous studies which find incumbent spending to be less effective in terms of altering 
election outcomes than challengers’ spending (Jacobson 1978, 1985; Abramowitz 1988). 
Spending and fundraising abilities after all are closely connected. While incumbents are more 
dependent upon PAC funds, they have less need of additional funds in general due to sizable 
campaign war chests (Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Goodliffe 2005; Herrson 2012). As a 
consequence, every additional dollar is likely to provide a lower marginal return. Thus, it makes 
sense that the returns to challengers and open-seat candidates, who can marginally benefit greatly 
from additional PAC support, would be higher.  
Revenue and Fundraising Costs 
With respect to revenue generation, PACs have performed well since the Citizens United 
ruling in 2010. In Figure 1, it is clear that in 2012 they were able to raise over $2.2 billion from 
individual donors in comparison to a total of $1.6 billion in the last presidential election cycle of 
2008 (all monies are in 2008 constant dollars). It is common for PACs to be able to raise more 
money in presidential election cycles (Magleby and Goodliffe 2014). However, there is some 
indication that PACs face increased competition from other interest groups. Super PACs 
increased their total receipts from individuals from $75.6 million in 2010 to $653 million in 2014 
(see Figure 1). Although there is a decline in super PAC fundraising revenue between the 
presidential and midterm election cycles just as there is for PACs, this decrease is smaller for 
super PACs than PACs. PACs raised $816.9 million less in 2014 than 2012 and super PACs 
raised $134.4 million less in 2014 than 2012. This suggests super PACs may have greater 
revenue stability than PACs.  
< Insert Figure 1 about here> 
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With regard to the costs of fundraising in Figure 2, the cost per dollar raised has 
increased for both PACs and super PACs overtime. Additionally, super PACs’ fundraising costs 
are lower than those of PACs in 2010, 2012, and 2014. However, initially in 2010, super PACs 
only spend an average of 15 cents less than PACs to raise a dollar. But the fundraising cost gap 
begins to widen in each subsequent election cycle. In 2012 on average a PAC spends 24 cents 
more than a super PACs to raise a dollar and by 2014 PACs spend on average 42 cents more to 
raise a dollar than super PACs (see Figure 2).  
< Insert Figure 2 about here> 
 
PACs Face New Challenges but Are Not Obsolete 
The first analysis demonstrates the factors that determine PAC fundraising success have 
changed overtime and provide some indication that PACs face new sources of fundraising 
competition. Declines in the impact of media prominence on donor fundraising between 2010 
and 2012, may be attributable to the sudden increase in the number of groups receiving media 
attention. Between 2010 and 2012 the number of new super PACs climbed from 83 to 1,310. 
Super PACs were mentioned in the Washington media an average of 13 times whereas 
traditional PACs were mentioned on average 24 times. Although PACs retain a clear advantage 
in terms of the media attention they receive, these figures are still impressive given that super 
PACs have had much less time to establish a reputation for themselves after the Court’s ruling in 
Citizens United in 2010 and given that there are so many new groups entering the electoral stage 
at once. Although media counts are not available, new applications for status as 501(c)4 social 
welfare organizations also rose from 1,751 in 2009 to 3,357 in 2012. Similarly, applications for 
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501(c)5 labor and agricultural organizations rose from 543 to 1,081 and for 501(c)6 professional 
associations from 1,828 to 2,338 (Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 2013). In 
this crowded and cacophonous media environment, PACs must make a greater effort to maintain 
and publicize their brand. Relatedly, PACs with membership bases had greater fundraising 
success in 2012 and 2014 when competition for donor contributions may have risen. Prior to 
2012, an established membership base did not significantly impact the recruitment of funds from 
donors but the attribute becomes an important fundraising characteristic after that. This suggests 
the PACs of trade associations, unions, and ideological and issue focused groups, such as 
EMILY’s List, appear to be more likely to continue to get checks from their members even if 
those donors are also contributing to other groups.  
The insignificant effect of having a soft money account as a consequence of the Carey v. 
FEC ruling is an indication that PACs occupy a more specialized niche in electoral financing. 
Although the ability to spend independently in unlimited amounts undeniably provides PACs 
with additional influence, it may not be influence PACs wish to have. It is becoming increasingly 
common for interest groups to diversify their fundraising strategies by creating affiliated super 
PACs and 501(c)4 groups to compliment the mission of the parent organization. For example, 
Sierra Club, a 501(c)4 environmental group, not only has a traditional political action committee, 
Sierra Club Political Committee, but it also formed Sierra Club Independent Action, a Super 
PAC. Additionally, it also boasts a 501(c)3 non-profit foundation which it uses to fund its 
conservation efforts. Other interest groups, such as the American Association of Retired Persons, 
EMILY’s List, and the National Rifle Association, have followed a similar diversification 
strategy. Additionally, very few PACs took advantage of the Carey ruling in the 2012 and 2014 
election cycles further suggesting interest groups favor a niche approach to fundraising. In 2012 
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63 PACs had a Carey account and in 2014, the number grew to only 99. This suggests that 
PAC’s financing edge lies with their ability to contribute directly to federal candidates and 
perhaps that is a significant enough of an advantage.  
 Further evidence that PACs face new competition for donor contributions lies in the 
revenue and fundraising cost data in Figures 1 and 2. Although PACs raised record amounts of 
hard dollar contributions in the 2012 presidential election cycle and record amounts of hard 
dollar contributions for a midterm election cycle in 2014, there is some indication that super 
PACs have less variation in fundraising revenue between midterm and presidential election 
cycles than PACs. Additionally, the fundraising cost gap is growing overtime. PACs must now 
spend more to raise each dollar than super PACs—in 2014, they had to spend 42 cents more than 
super PACs. An examination of the average contribution made by individual donors to PACs 
versus super PACs in each election cycle also attests to the growing fundraising power of super 
PACs. In 2010, the average donor contribution to PACs was $778 and the average super PAC 
donor contribution was $8,168. In 2012, PACs raised an average donation of $1,324 similar to 
the average of $1,063 they raised in the last presidential election cycle of 2008. However, the 
average donor contribution to super PACs rose to $24,655 in 2012. By the 2014 midterm 
election cycle, the average donor contribution to PACs was $851, roughly the same as the last 
midterm election cycle whereas the average donor contribution to super PACs had risen to 
$15,323. Although these descriptive statistics suggest PACs have consistently maintained their 
revenue flows, they also point to the inherent fundraising advantages of super PACs and the 
increasing willingness of donors to support them.  
 Nonetheless, the real test of PACs’ continuing influence lies in the value of hard dollar 
contributions to federal candidates. The results of the electoral competition analysis suggest PAC 
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money increased in relevance between the pre-BCRA and post-BCRA eras. For incumbents, 
above median PAC support did not increase their vote margins in the pre-BCRA era but 
increased their margins by 2.5 percent in the post-BCRA era. For non-incumbent candidates 
running in the pre-BCRA time period, the increase for an average candidate’s vote margin was 
predicted to be 3.59 percent whereas in the post-BCRA era the predicted increase rose to 6.8 
percent. The findings of the first fundraising analysis echo these results. In Table 1, in each 
subsequent election cycle every additional congressional candidate PACs support increases their 
predicted fundraising totals from donors. Together these findings suggest PACs’ ability to 
contribute directly to candidates still counts as a major advantage and is growing in its 
importance overtime.  
PAC’s increasing electoral impact likely relates to several developments. First, in 
keeping with La Raja and Schaffner’s (2015) theory, PAC support may have increased in 
importance as parties’ role in elections has been curbed. As they argue, “when resources for 
party organizations are reduced, influence moves away from pragmatists within party 
organizations toward the purist factions operating through policy-demanding organizations” (90). 
Although ideological purists are also predicted to utilize super PACs and 501(c)organizations to 
gain more influence in elections (La Raja and Schaffner 2015), it is reasonable to assume PACs’ 
relevance would also increase as purists gain more influence within the party coalitions. 
Additionally, parties have shifted their spending tactics in order to compete in the new interest 
group dominated environment in the post-BCRA era (Baker 2014). The national party 
organizations now support dramatically fewer congressional candidates with direct contributions, 
commit more of their funds to independent expenditures which cannot be coordinated with 
candidate campaigns or allied interest group organizations, and spend more money and provide 
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more contributions to candidates close to Election Day (Baker 2014). Together these 
developments potentially make PAC’s hard dollar support more valuable for candidate 
campaigns seeking direct contributions to fund their campaigns throughout the duration of the 
election cycle.  
Hard dollar contributions, unlike independent expenditures, provide the candidate’s 
campaign with control over how the funds get spent (La Raja and Schaffner 2015). As super 
PACs and 501(c)4 and 6 groups become the dominant spenders in congressional elections, 
particularly on advertising, candidates are more reliant upon hard dollar fundraising to ensure 
they are able to spend money to rely their own messages to voters. Additionally, PAC 
contributions are often accompanied by public endorsements of the candidate, which have been 
shown to increase contributions to non-incumbent House candidates from donors (Baker 2015b). 
Many PACs also engage in other support activities such as informing their membership about the 
candidate and generally promoting the candidate on their websites and in other public 
communications (Baker 2015b; La Raja and Schaffner 2015). These are activities in which super 
PACs and 501(c)4 social welfare organizations (although not 501(c)5 unions and 501(c)6 
professional associations) minimally engage in part because most lack established reputations 
and membership bases that are needed for effective endorsements and mobilization. And legally, 
they cannot appear to be or actually be coordinating with the campaign if they are spending 
independently to support the candidate or to oppose the candidate’s opponent.  
 Despite new sources of competition from super PACs and 501(c)4,5 and 6 groups for 
campaign contributions and electoral influence, PACs continue to play an important and 
specialized role in electoral politics. As long as direct contributions to candidates remain limited 
by law both in amount and by their source, PACs will occupy this vital niche. Their strategic 
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relevance to election financing may diminish overtime as independent expenditures by super 
PACs and 501(c)4 and 6 groups flood the electoral process but it will certainly not disappear 
unless the Supreme Court says otherwise. While PACs are no longer the sole vehicle for infusing 
interest group money into federal elections, they are an important source of financial support for 
federal candidates and this continues to provide them with a major advantage. They also 
represent a transparent and legitimate vehicle for interest group influence that helps maintain the 
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Table 1: Characteristics Predicting PACs' Fundraising from Donors 
2008-2014  
VARIABLES 2008 2010 2012 2014 
         
PAC Media Mentions (#) 1.966* 2.615* 2.322 1.961 
 (0.892) (1.176) (1.608) (1.244) 
 
Congressional Candidates Supported (#) 1.786*** 1.937*** 2.176*** 2.845*** 
 (0.254) (0.212) (0.216) (0.252) 
 
Party Ally (1/0)  622.1 169.1* 167.7 554.6 
 (491.2) (80.65) (89.88) (443.8) 
 
Carey PAC (1/0)   60.91 6.584 
   (42.67) (25.08) 
 
Membership Based (1/0)  49.54 23.19 34.97*** 46.48*** 
 (32.47) (17.86) (10.41) (10.43) 
 
Leadership PAC (1/0)  -1.439 7.516 8.707 5.903 
 (44.22) (22.43) (10.26) (7.200) 
 
Constant 5.303 9.043 -5.968 -12.35 
 (5.655) (15.70) (4.908) (6.496) 
     
Observations 4,292 4,337 4,452 4,235 
R-squared 0.045 0.037 0.238 0.286 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     


















Table 2: Coarsened Exact Matching of House Non-Incumbent Candidates 













Balance Criteria  C T C T C T C T 
Number of Cases  1297 1298 1297 1298 1086 1086 1086 1086 
Number of Matched Cases 1116 423 640 413 951 379 859 435 
Number of Unmatched 
Cases  181 875 657 885 135 707 227 651 
Multivariate L1 Distance  0.882 0.683 0.826 0.650 
Number of Strata 783 700 693 489 
Number of Matched Strata  95 99 67 79 













Number of Cases  1053  1295 
R-Squared   0.01  0.03 

























Table 3: Coarsened Exact Matching of House Incumbent Candidates 
   1992-2002 2004-2014 








Balance Criteria  C T C T C T C T 
Number of Cases  1135 1156 1135 1156 1195 1199 1195 1199 
Number of Matched Cases 908 474 374 304 1052 691 593 519 
Number of Unmatched Cases  227 682 761 852 143 508 602 680 
Multivariate L1 Distance  0.987 0.898 0.982 0.796 
Number of Strata 799 1260 678 1044 
Number of Matched Strata  170 183 137 180 








Constant  --- 27.01*** (1.006) --- 34.52*** (0.995) 
Number of Cases  661  1105 
R-Squared   0.000  0.003 
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Figure 1: Sources of Revenue (Constant 2008 Dollars) PACs versus Super 
PACs
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Fundraising Costs of PACs and Super PACs. Any expenditures relating to all forms of 
fundraising, such as event invitations and catering, are included in the calculations of total 
fundraising costs made from the U.S. Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) operating 
expenditure files 2008-2014. The FEC provides numeric codes for the categorization of itemized 
disbursements. When PACs or super PACs utilized the fundraising code, i.e. 003, the line item 
was retained in the file unless there was an obvious error. However, PACs and super PACs 
utilize these codes less than 50 percent of the time. The majority of line-items are not categorized 
at all. As a consequence, it was necessary to prune the operating files on a line-item basis in 
order to calculate the total fundraising expenditures made by the PAC or super PAC. More 
obvious fundraising expenditures, such as auction items and event expenses, are included in the 
totals. Categories, such as postage and printing, required a clear set of guidelines for deletion. 
The rule that was followed for these large categories was that any descriptions that implied the 
cost was not a fundraising cost led to the deletion of the line-item. As groups often include 
information about how to donate on their mailings, I retain almost all postage and printing entries 
as fundraising costs unless a code or description indicated it was not. As a rule, in-kind 
contributions were deleted. There were also many line items that were clearly not fundraising 
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costs and could be quickly deleted. For example, they include: polling, health insurance, GOTV 
specific materials, and office rent. Finally, PACs also spend money on a wide variety of 
activities to assist in donor recruitment and cultivation that included line items such as opera 
tickets, boat rentals, golf green fees, and hunting licenses. These were retained. Gifts to donors 
and any auction items or entertainment used at donor events are also retained.  
